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Abstract. UML class and sequence diagrams are used as the basis for runtime
profiling along with either offline or online analysis to determine whether the
execution conforms to the diagrams. Situations where sequence diagrams are in-
tended to characterize all possible executions are described. The approach gen-
erates an execution tree of all possible sequences, using a detailed collection of
graph transformations that represent a precise operational semantics for sequence
diagrams, including treatment for polymorphism, multiple activations, reference
to other diagrams, and the use of frames in sequence diagrams. The sequence di-
agrams are also used to determine the information that should be gathered about
method calls in the system. Aspects that can follow the flow of messages in a
distributed system, are generated and the results of execution are recorded. The
execution tree is used to automatically check the recorded execution to detect
operations that do not correspond to any of the diagrams. These represent either
new types of sequence diagrams that should be added to the collection, or imple-
mentation errors where the system is not responding as designed. In either case,
it is important to identify such situations.
Keywords: runtime verification, UML class and sequence diagrams, execution se-
mantics, graph transformation, aspect-oriented profiling.
1 Introduction
Software models are increasingly used in different phases of the software development
life cycle. Here we consider class and sequence diagram models from the UML [1]
suite of design models, and use them as the basis for run-time verification and analysis
of implemented code. UML is a widely accepted/standardized modeling language for
Object-Oriented (OO) systems. Although many diagrams exist, the two most popular
are generally acknowledged to be class diagrams to describe the structure and interre-
lationships among the classes, and sequence diagrams to describe sequences of method
calls among objects that together describe important usage scenarios.
Class diagrams list the fields and methods in each class, and show which classes
use other classes, which inherit from others, and multiplicities of classes in various
relationships with other classes. Sequence diagrams are commonly used for partially
documenting the behavior of the software system as interaction patterns among objects.
Due to polymorphism, conditional frames, and multiple activations, these diagrams can
represent many possible execution sequences and complex interactions.
Other notations for describing constraints, such as temporal logic, or even state di-
agrams and the Object Constraint Language (OCL) notations within UML, suffer from
low availability: they simply are not widely used in industrial contexts, and are less
likely to be updated as the system evolves. For example, UML state diagrams further
describe the behavior of a system by defining the internal states and transitions among
them for the classes (and objects derived from them). They are sometimes used to de-
scribe abstract versions of key protocols. However, it is actually rare to provide a full set
of state diagrams, since they are viewed as extraneous and considered to be low-level.
We need to make sure that the implementation is consistent with the diagrams. Since
user intervention, reaction, and decision-making are often involved in the use of such
reactive systems, runtime verification of conformance is needed, in addition to testing
and formal verification of the code. As explained in more detail in the related work
section, most other works on using UML to generate monitors concentrate on the class
diagrams. Even the few that use sequence diagrams do not treat necessary and common
features such as polymorphism, multiple activations, and tracing over multiple sequence
diagrams where one diagram refers to another.
Sequence diagrams have traditionally been used as a source for test cases that can
be executed on the implemented system to see whether an expected sequence of method
calls and responses occurs. This is reasonable if the sequence diagrams are seen simply
as describing some sample scenarios of interaction, that in no way prevent other uses
and orderings of method calls in the system. Sometimes this is indeed the approach
used by software developers to describe expectations from a particular class or method
within it: the overall behavior is implicitly understood by describing typical, but by no
means exhaustive, cases of its use.
However, there are many software systems with UML designs where the sequence
diagrams are more exhaustive: each sequence diagram provides a transaction-like de-
scription of scenarios that once begun, should be completed, and the collection of se-
quence diagrams is intended to show the entire possible use of the system. For a bank-
ing system, for example, the provided user actions of initiating a cash withdrawal, a
transfer of funds, a deposit, etc, must be followed by an entire sequence of method
calls described in one of the sequence diagrams. In the Crisis Mangagement case study
presented in the following section, the types of crisis (car accident, fire, etc.) are all as-
sumed to have corresponding sequence diagrams that design the proper response after
analyzing the needs. When a situation is encountered that does not correspond to any
of the diagrams, either it is a new type of crisis, or the system is not responding as de-
signed. In either case, it is important to identify such situations. Such a use of sequence
diagrams is also supported by the extension to live sequence charts [2] where after a
pre-sequence occurs, an instance of the main sequence must follow.
When the sequence diagrams are used in this way, they can be used to automatically
generate run-time profiling aspects and offline or online analyzers that detect when the
system is not being used in conformance with any of the sequence diagrams. As noted
above, such detection could mean either that the collection of sequence diagrams is
incomplete, and new scenarios need to be added, or indeed that the implemented system
is reacting incorrectly, and some object does not respond as expected to a method call
that is part of a scenario.
The approach taken here is to use the sequence diagrams directly to generate a state
graph and then an execution tree of all possible abstract states and method calls in the
system based on the available knowledge. Since the internal behavior of the methods
in the objects is not available, we only check for key visible events, interleaved with
internal events and possibly actions from other scenarios. The implemented code and
the sequence diagrams are analyzed automatically to determine which information must
be collected, and to generate run-time non-invasive aspects that log messages and rel-
evant information, including tracking of the connections between threads in different
processors that correspond to a single execution of a sequence diagram. For our im-
plementation, the gathered information is automatically analyzed offline to detect non-
conformance with the collection of scenarios, and provide helpful feedback. We also
describe how to detect the deviations during execution, simply by sending the gathered
information directly to an online version of the analyzer.
This paper introduces an additional automatic traceability and verification step to
detect inconsistencies between specified UML sequence diagrams and the actual run-
time behavior. One of the key difficulties of run-time verification is knowing what to
check, and providing a practical way for users to express that. Since sequence diagrams
are already widely used to specify what is possible in a system, their direct use for
run-time verification is both natural and useful.
Our approach is fully automated with a set of integrated simulation, run-time verifi-
cation and feedback generation tools. Furthermore, it can be applied to systems that are
composed of a set of distributed sub-systems developed in multiple languages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we
present a motivating example on the design of a crisis management system (CMS) to
illustrate the problem. Section 3 describes related work in greater detail. In Section 4,
we provide an overview of the approach, while Sections 5, 6 and 7 detail the simulation
of the sequence diagrams, the extraction of information to generate run-time monitors,
and the automatic analysis to detect deviations. Section 8 has a summary of application
to the motivating example, while Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Motivating Example
Helping the victims of a crisis situation requires rigid management and allocation of
resources. For example, the allocated resources should be accounted for and free re-
sources should be assigned to a crisis by their location. The Crisis Management System
(CMS) case study [3] provides requirements for designing and implementing a software
system to manage the resources. In this section, we provide one design alternative to
illustrate how our approach can help in finding inconsistencies between UML models
and the implementation.
Our design alternative focuses on coordination of the crisis resolution process. To
facilitate this, we added support for scenarios for recurring crises in our design. A
scenario prescribes the actions that should be taken in order to resolve the specific
crisis like a car accident. As the users become experienced with recurring crises, they
may want to extend existing scenarios and/or add new scenarios to the system. Thus,
we modularized the scenarios in our design. The scenarios can be viewed as reactive
systems that act upon outside events about the state of the crisis, which are: crisis start,
resource allocate, resource dispatch, initial report about the crisis, resolution failed and
crisis resolved. Both the scenarios and the system framework that organizes them can
be described using class and sequence diagrams.
+ScenarioOutSideEvent(in eventType : int, in evetData : object)
+ScenarioBroadCastEvent(in recourceEventType : int, in eventData : object)
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#setEndTime()
#addWorkerReport(in report : string)
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-registredScenarioOutSideListeners *
1
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Fig. 1. The class diagram and a sequence diagram of the CMS
The event-based communication and the modularization of the scenarios can be sup-
ported by using the observer pattern. Here, the observer provides the interface of events
to which the scenarios should react. Figure 1 illustrates the class diagram of the design
with these patterns. Here, the class Server provides methods where the users (e.g., the
user interface) communicate with the scenarios. The interface IScenarioOutSideEvent
lists the events to which the scenarios should react. A scenario implements this inter-
face and in each method, the actions it should take are specified. The class ScenarioData
holds the data about the crisis, such as the allocated resources and the time the crisis
started. Each crisis has a distinct type designated with the attribute ScenarioData.type.
The sequence diagram Server.ScenarioOutSideEvent in Figure 1 shows the Server
looping through the list of scenarios and letting them know about the start of a crisis.
Note that the call to the method ScenarioOutSideEvent is asynchronous; the class Server
executes as a different process so that events arriving at the same time from different
sources can be handled. The call to the method fireStart is polymorphic and any instance
of a scenario can receive this call. Upon receiving an event, a scenario decides if it is
interested in the crisis or not with the value of this attribute. This is illustrated with the
sequence diagram CarCrashScenario.fireStart() in Figure 2.
The CMS has constraints essential for correct operation that emerge from the dia-
grams. For example, from the class diagrams it is clear that they should handle the list of
events. The reactions to the events can be seen in the sequence diagrams of the scenar-
ios. These constraints should be correctly reflected in the implementation, as a violation
of a constraint may have catastrophic effects in CMS. In addition, scenarios may react
to the same event and interfere with each other, which is considered additional source
of complication.
As an example, assume that the CMS is deployed in an environment where only
car accidents are managed. In due time, the users realize some accidents need priori-
tization. One such example is presidential emergencies coordinated by the class Pre-
scenario : 
CarCrashScenario
setBeginTime(time)
sData : ScenarioData
[sType=CarCrashScenario]
executeStateAction(sData)
state : 
ScenarioAccepted
opt
scenarioStart()
fireStart(sData,sType)
CarCrashScenario.fireStart(sData,sType)
«interface»
Scenario::IScenarioBroadcastEvent
«interface»
Scenario::IScenarioOutSideEvent
scenario : 
CarCrashScenario
deallocateResource(res)
ResourceManager: 
ResourceManager
firePreEmpt(sData,sType)
CarCrashScenario.firePreEmpt(sData,sType)
Scenario::CarCrashScenario
Fig. 2. The class CarCrachScenario and the sequence diagram showing the handling of
the event fireStart()
sidentialEmergency. Prioritization then becomes a requirement, where a high priority
scenario may require another scenario to release its resources. The design allows re-
leasing of the resources through scenario broadcast events; a high-priority scenario
asks the other scenarios to release resources by calling the method Server.ScenarioOut-
SideEvent(), which in turn calls the method IScenarioOutSideEvent.firePreEmpt(). The
designer models the sequence diagrams showing the object CarCrashScenario handling
the event firePreEmpt. Now assume that the developers do not correctly implement this
previously unnecessary sequence diagram, so the resources are in fact not released.
PresidentEmergency.fireStart(sData,sType)
scenario: 
PresidentalEmergency
setBeginTime(time)
scenarioData: 
ScenarioData
[scenarioType=PresidentEmergency]
Server:Server
ScenarioBroadCastEvent(preEmpt,sData)
fireStart(sData,sType)
opt
Fig. 3. Sequence diagram show-
ing the scenario presidential emer-
gency handling the event fireStart.
As shown in Figure 3, the scenario Presidential-
Emergency throws the broadcast event for releas-
ing resources when it starts. Because the sequence
diagram of CarCrashScenario responding to this
event is not correctly implemented, it does not
release the resources causing the coordination of
the presidential emergencies to fail. The error is
caused by the code not conforming to the se-
quence diagrams and, in the remaining sections
of this paper, we describe how the approach pro-
posed in this paper can capture such conformance
errors.
3 Related Work
In the literature, the conformance checking of
UML class diagram models with the implementation has been addressed in several
ways. Code generation techniques [4] directly generate program skeletons (class dec-
larations and lists of method headers) that can then be expanded to full systems and
are guaranteed to satisfy the structural requirements of the class diagram. Mappings
can be used to connect formal model elements to UML model elements using predicate
logic [5], and runtime state observation can be used to check for consistent use [6].
These techniques only consider structural UML diagrams (class or object diagrams in
particular) for conformance matching and do not address the conformance of the be-
havior/interactions specified using UML sequence diagrams.
A partial solution that does restrict the behavior is provided by adding class in-
variants or other assertions to the class diagram, using the OCL (Object Constraint
Language) notation. Such assertions can then be verified for the implementation, either
using static formal methods, or using well-known run-time verification approaches to
check assertions about the state of the system. Unfortunately, such invariants are again
not always provided in industrial uses of UML, and of course do not treat liveness or
required sequences of actions.
Some approaches such as [7, 8] aim at checking the behavioral correctness of soft-
ware by utilizing state diagrams as their specification language. The problem with state
diagram is the level of granularity depends on the employed language/tool for mod-
elling. Thus UML state diagrams can only model the behavior within an object, and
not inter-object behavior or message flow. Other languages such as Stateflow [9] fo-
cus on the modelling of the abstract behavior of software, without providing constructs
to model objects and interactions within and among objects that realize the behavior.
Therefore, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to use Stateflow for more fined-grained
models of the software.
To overcome the shortcomings of state diagrams, [10–12] make use of UML se-
quence diagrams as their specification language to verify security policies and web-
service interactions, respectively. Although a sequence diagram can include polymor-
phic calls, calls made by multiple threads of execution, or activate other sequence di-
agrams, those approaches cannot verify such advanced features of sequence diagrams.
For example, in our case study, we would not be able to verify that the execution of
PresidentialEmergencyScenario in one thread results in the release of resources that
are acquired by another thread executing CarCrashScenario. The polymorphic nature
of fireStart in the example is also beyond the capabilities of those tools.
There are several approaches [13–16] that make use of formalisms such as temporal
logics and regular expressions for their specification language. One may try to express
design conformance criteria as predicates in these formalisms and verify the implemen-
tation of software against these predicates. However, there are two difficulties. First, it
is likely that most industrial developers are not expert in these formalisms, and would
show resistance to using them [17]. Second, instead of reusing design models, separate
specifications are used for the verification, which implies that the specifications must
also be updated as the software evolves. In the development of complex software with
strict time-to-market requirements, it is already a challenge to keep the design docu-
ments up-to-date [18], and having more documents (i.e. verification specifications) to
update is a time-consuming and error-prone activity.
There are other works such as [19] which extend the message sequence charts
of UML as their specification language. However, we believe that such customized
versions of UML are not widely used in industrial environments.
4 Requirements and Overview of the Solution
In view of the shortcomings of existing techniques, we identify the following require-
ments for a conformance checking system based on class and sequence diagrams:
1) The ability to distinguish between polymorphic calls. As Figures 2 and 3 show,
the invocations of fireStart and firePrempt on Scenario objects can be received by dif-
ferent scenarios. Here, according to the object on which the polymorphic methods are
invoked, the conformance checking system must be able to match the execution trace
with the corresponding sequence diagram.
2) The ability to check the conformance of sequences that span multiple sequence di-
agrams. For example, a sequence diagram may use a reference frame to include or
activate another sequence diagram, as seen in the PresidentialEmergency diagram.
3) The ability to support multiple activations. In the implementation of our motivat-
ing example, multiple sources (running as different processes and threads) may trigger
an event by calling the method ScenarioOutSideEvent. Here, the conformance checking
system must be able to distinguish between the execution trace of each thread, and must
check each trace against the corresponding sequence diagram.
In this paper, we describe an implemented conformance checking system that ad-
dresses the requirements above. To utilize sequence diagrams as the specification, we
provide a simulator which constructs an execution tree from the sequence diagrams.
The execution trees are later on used as specification for the conformance verification.
The verification is done in an off-line manner, after the execution of the software ter-
minates, which implies that the execution traces of software must be profiled for the
off-line analysis. We make use of aspect-oriented programming to generate profiling
aspects (i.e. observers) and insert the aspects into the implemented software code.
Figure 4 shows the three-phase architecture of our approach. In the compilation
phase, a developer specifies the sequence and class diagrams, and the XML represen-
tation of the diagrams are input to the tools UML to Graph Convertor and Transla-
tor. The tool UML to Graph Convertor converts class and sequence diagrams to their
equivalent graph representation. The generated graphs are input to the simulator called
GROOVE [20], to which we added contains detailed graph transformation rules that
closely mimic the actual OO execution of the operations described in the sequence di-
agrams. These are used to generate an execution tree of all possible executions that
conform to the sequence diagrams (that we call a simulation).
In the right-hand side, for each specified sequence diagram, the tool Translator gen-
erates the Profiling aspect in the aspect-oriented language Compose* [21]. Translator
checks the static structure of the software to extract a list of methods defined in the
code. In addition, it receives information about the so-called activator method (i.e. the
first method that is invoked in a sequence diagram) from each sequence diagram, and
generates the Profiling aspects. The aspects log information about the methods that are
invoked during the execution of an activator method. Since multiple invocations to an
activator method may exist, the Profiling aspects distinguish among the invocations by
associating a unique identifier, called ActivationID, to each of them. Consequently, sep-
arate log files are generated for each invocation of the activator method.
If during the execution of an activator method, a remote method is invoked in an-
other process, the corresponding ActivationID must be passed to the target process and
ActivationID must be preserved until the call returns to the caller process. This facili-
tates logging the information about all the local and remote invocations during the exe-
cution of an activator method. The Profiling aspects are input to the Compose* compiler
which generates the executable codes for the aspects and inserts them in the software
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Fig. 4. The overall architecture of our solution
code. The module Code Analyzer within the Compose* compiler checks the software
code to detect whether there is an inter-process communication (i.e. remote method in-
vocation) within the context of an activator method. The analysis is done based on the
available static information about the remote method invocations, for example, sockets
or Java-RMI method invocations. If there is such an invocation, the module Causality
Manager modifies the invocation in both caller and callee sides with one more parame-
ter holding ActivationID. Both Code Analyzer and Causality Manager receive the name
of activator methods as input from the sequence diagrams.
After the execution terminates, the tool Conformance Checker verifies the log file
against the simulation and provides feedback to the developer. The feedback includes
both where and in which sequence diagram a deviation is found, and the sequence of
calls that led to the deviation including the inconsistent method call or other response.
Although in this work we focus on off-line conformance checking, it is relatively
straightforward to accomplish an online checker as well. Here, we need to implement
the tool Conformance Checker as another aspect which receives the required informa-
tion from the Profiling aspects and checks the observed information against the already-
generated execution trees.
As we will explain in the following sections, the sequence diagrams and gener-
ated execution models and states are independent from the implementation language
of the software. Moreover, the Compose* language is also a language- and platform-
independent aspect-oriented language; and the Compose* compiler can compile aspects
for various language environments such as Java, .Net and C. This increases the applica-
bility of our approach to software developed in various or even multiple languages.
5 From Class and Sequence Diagrams to Graph Transition System
The simulation of the class and sequence diagrams models are realized with graph-
based state-space generation [20] by i) Defining a model for representing an OO-like
runtime for the UML models with graphs, and ii) Modeling generic execution and ex-
ception handling semantics with graph-transformation rules over this model. The main
reason for adopting graph-based state-space generation is that UML models can be
transformed to graph models in a relatively straightforward manner. Also, the user is
not requested to provide any other specifications than the UML class and sequence
diagrams.
The simulation of the models resembles the execution of an OO software system.
For this, we use Design Configuration Models (DCMs), whose meta-model is defined
with Design Configuration Modeling Language (DCML), which includes a call stack,
operation frames and program counters in addition to the UML elements. These models
are represented as graphs since we defined the OO-like execution semantics with graph
transformation rules.The DCMs are not defined to be a full semantic representation of
OO software. They only include elements that can be modeled with class and sequence
diagram models. A DCM is generated from one class diagram and at least one sequence
diagram. We programmed a proof-of-concept converter for ArgoUML [22] and the in-
terested readers are referred to [23] for a detailed description of the UML-to-DCML
conversion.
The simulation starts from a user specified method we refer to as the activator
method. It generates a state-space, called the Graph Transition System (GTS), show-
ing all possible execution sequences that can be achieved by the invoke of the activator
method. The state-space is a tree where each path from root to a leaf node is an execu-
tion sequence. The simulation is realized with a graph-production system, consisting of
57 graph transformation rules that model OO-like execution semantics for UML class
and sequence diagrams (these rules can be downloaded from [24]). With these rules the
following actions of the sequence diagrams is simulated:
Follow in the activation bars – DCML contains a program counter, which shows the
action to be simulated. This program counter is advanced in the activation bar once the
action simulation completes.
Call invocation – Allows the simulation of the call instances, self calls, super calls
and calls to static methods. For example, the dispatch of a call to an instance method
involves finding the receiver object, and then, traversing the inheritance hierarchy to
find the latest implementation of the operation. If the object receiving the call imple-
ments the called operation, then the inheritance hierarchy is not traversed. If, on the
other hand, the object does not implement the operation, the super-type of this object
is traversed. After the method implementation is located, an operation frame for the
method is created. The program counter of this operation frame points to the first action
of the method (i.e. the first action in the activation bar). The newly created frame also
contains a pointer (in the form of an edge) to the operation frame from which the call is
made; in this way, a call stack is simulated. The semantics of the call to an instance is
implemented with 5 graph transformation rules. These rules match when the program
counter is a call action node whose receiver is an instance.
Asynchronous call invocation– These are presently allowed only as activator messages
that initiate a sequence diagram. For asynchronous calls that are activator messages, be-
fore the call is invoked, a transformation rule increase the attribute activationCount of
the operation frame. In this way, multiple invocations of the activator method can be
distinguished in the state-space.
Parameter passing – is realized by going through the parameters specified in a call
action and adding the necessary graph-edges so that the values/object of the parameters
are accessible to the dispatched method: for in parameters these graph-edges simulate
call-by-value and for out/in-out parameters they simulate call-by-reference.
Create operations – simulation of these creates a new object which represents the clas-
sifier receiving the create action in the sequence diagram.
Return from a method – is simulated in two steps when the program counter points to
a return action. In the first step, if the returning method has a return value, it is copied to
the previous (calling) operation frame. In the second step, a transformation rule “pops”
the frame of the returning method from the call stack.
Return value assignments – After the pop of the operation frame, if a return value is
copied to the top of the call stack, this return value is assigned to a variable specified
in the call action. The assignment is also simulated in two steps: first the type compat-
ibility of the returned value and the assigned variable is checked. Then, if this check
succeeds, the variable gets the return value of a method.
Conditional execution – When the program counter is at an alternative frame with N
frame fragments, the simulation continues in N branches: in each branch the actions
within one of these fragments are simulated. For an optional frame, two branches are
created, one activating the operational frame, and one ignoring it.
Loops – The simulation of a loop frame, requires the user to specify the desired num-
ber of iterations. Semantics of loops are modeled with 2 transformation rules, which
match when the simulation reaches a loop frame node. One of these transformation
rules arranges the program counter so that the simulation loops over the actions within
the loop fragment. The second transformation rule tests whether the loop is repeated by
the user-specified amount and, if so, it terminates the loop.
Figure 5 illustrates an excerpt of the GTS from the simulation of the sequence dia-
grams shown in Figures 1- 3. The sequence diagram S1 shows the operation frame and
the program counter at state S1: the program counter is at the beginning of the activation
bar of the classifier Server showing that the call ScenarioOutSideEvent() has just been
dispatched. From state S1 the simulation moves to state S2 with the transition nextcall,
which is the name of the graph transformation rule responsible for incrementing the
program counter. Since at S1 the call ScenarioOutSideEvent() is dispatched, this rule
matches and moves the simulation to the beginning of the next action. The sequence
diagram S2 shows the program counter at state S2.
The call fireStart is a polymorphic call and can be received by the instance of classes
that implement the interface IScenarioOutSideEvent. There are two such instances in
the input sequence diagrams and, so, there are two outgoing transitions from the state
S2. When the program counter is at a polymorphic call, the transformation rule Poly-
morphicReceiver has a match for each possible receiver. Each match picks one of the
receivers and the application of the match arranges the picked instance as the receiver of
the call. This multiple matching causes branching. After the arrangement of the receiver
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Fig. 5. An excerpt from the GTS of the simulation of the sequence diagrams
Server.ScenarioOutSideEvent(), CarCrashScenario.fireStart(), and PresidentialEmer-
gency.fireStart() depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
instance, the call is simulated. The sequence diagrams S6 and S11 corresponding to the
states with the same name, show the operation frame after the call dispatched: at state
S6 the call fireStart is received by the instance of the class CarCrashScenario and at
state S11, it is received by the instance of the class PresidentialEmergency. Even though
these receivers are in different sequence diagrams, the execution sequences where they
respond to a call from the users (i.e. the call ScenarioOutSideEvent()) is generated.
The GTS also includes transitions that display which methods begin/end executing.
These transitions are added by parameterized transformation rules; i.e, a rule specifies a
set of node attributes that should be output instead of the parameters. For example, a la-
bel executeMethod( activationCount, ClassifierID, ClassName, MethodName) is added
by the transformation rule executeMethod which matches when the program counter is
at the beginning of an activation bar.
6 Runtime Observation
During the execution of software, upon the invocation of the activator method, the cor-
responding profiling aspect is activated, and consequently the runtime transitive effect
of the activator method is logged. The output of the logger is the observed execution
sequence, which is a a state machine where each state has at most one transition. The
transitions are of the form < action > ( activationID, ObjectID, ClassName, Method-
Name). Here, the action can be executeMethod when the logger observers the start of
a method or returnMethod when the logger observes the end of a method. To facili-
tate the conformance checking, the class name, object unique identifier (ObjectID),
method name and arguments of the methods are logged. As we explained in Section
4, we distinguish between multiple invocations of an activator method by assigning a
unique identifier called activationID to each invocation, and we log the execution trace
initiated from each invocation in a separate logfile. Note that each logfile must eventu-
ally finish (be closed) in order to check for deviations. This can be guaranteed even for
executions that do not perform expected events by, for example, building in an “error”
operation that closes a log file whenever a time bound has passed with no activity in
that log.
S1 S2
executeMethod(3:1807500377:
CarCrashScenario,
fireStart)
S3
executeMethod(3:1901116749:
ScenarioData.
setStartTime)
return(3:1901116749:
ScenarioData.
setStartTime)
S4S5
returnMethod(3:1807500377:
CarCrashScenario,
fireStart)
S6
executes(3:Server:Server.
ScenarioOutSideEvent,)
S7
returnMethod(3:Server:Server.
ScenarioOutSideEvent,)
Fig. 6. An example observed execution sequence.
In Figure 6 an example output of the logger is shown. Here, after the activator
method Server.ScenarioOutSideEvent() starts execution, the car crash scenario executes
and returns. The logging stops with the return of the activator method.
7 Verifying Runtime Observation with GTS
The verification is realized by tracing the GTS with the transitions of an observed ex-
ecution sequence. However, before the tracing starts the GTS is converted to a non-
deterministic automata, we refer to as an abstract execution. This automata is generated
in the following steps: 1) all transitions except the ones added by the
Start
S2
executeMethod(1:
Server:Server.
ScenarioOutSideEvent,)
S5
executeMethod(1:OID:
CarCrashScenario,
fireStart)
S4
executeMethod(1:OID:
PresidentialEmergency,
fireStart)
*
*
*
S1
Fig. 7. The abstract execution au-
tomaton for the example GTS in
Figure 5.
informative transformation rules are removed. 2)
The states where a different invocation of the acti-
vator method occurs (i.e. states with different acti-
vationCounts) are connected to the start state with
λ transitions. 3) a self transition labeled *, a wild
card transition, is added to each state except the
start state. The semantics of the wildcard transi-
tion is specified as follows:
Let `i be the labels of the all the outgoing transi-
tions from state Si and let U be the union of all
transition labels from an observed execution se-
quence. The wildcard transition for Si are all the
input whose label belongs to U − `i.
The wildcard transition allows us to abstract away
from the observed execution sequence to the level
of the sequence diagram: as a sequence diagram shows the sequence of important calls,
the observed execution may contain calls that are not modeled in it. During the verifi-
cation the wildcard transitions allows us to map these calls that are not in the sequence
diagrams to don’t cares. Figure 7 illustrates the abstract execution for the GTS pre-
sented in Figure 5. Here, there is only one λ transition because there is one invocation
of the activator method Server.ScenarioOutSideEvent().
The verification algorithm applies the transitions in the order they are seen from
the observed execution sequence to the abstract execution, taking wildcard (irrelevant)
operations into account. After applying these transitions, it checks if a final state or
a state with a different activationCount in the abstract execution is reached. If such a
state is not reached, then there are calls missing in the observed execution sequence
which are in the sequence diagram. An important part of the verification is the binding
of the identifiers. The classifier and the activation identifiers from the abstract execution
are treated as variables, which are bound to actual values from the observed execution
sequence. At a transition Ta of the abstract execution, if the method and the class names
match to the next transition To from observed execution but the activation/classifier
identifiers (activationCount, classifierID) are not bound, then the activation/classifier
identifiers of Ta are set to the values of these identifiers at To.
We programmed an extension to GROOVE, that uses the output of the runtime
observer and verifies it against the GTS generated from the simulation of UML models.
Here, the verification step is repeated for each log file.
8 Case Study: Crisis Management System
In Section 2, we described an example inconsistency between the sequence diagrams
of the CMS and an implementation, where the scenario car crash does not handle the
request to preempt its resources correctly. Here, we show how our approach can de-
tect this inconsistency. For simulation, we used the sequence diagrams showing the
handling of the event fireAllocate() for the classes CarCrashScenario and Presiden-
tialEmergency scenario, in addition to the class and sequence diagrams presented in
Figures 1, 2 and 3. Each of these two additional sequence diagrams have 3 call ac-
tions (and 3 return actions); the DCM generated from these diagrams contains 36 ac-
tions. With these diagrams we simulated following scenario: the user interface making
4 outside events; these events are all different invocations of the activator method, and
so, they are shown as asynchronous calls. The simulation of these diagrams generated
20075 states and 21007 transitions and completed in 2 minutes using 37Mb memory
(with 2.2GHz Core Duo2 laptop running JRE 1.6 11). The simulation generated this
many states because the GTS contains every possible execution of the sequence dia-
grams. For example, an invocation of the method ScenarioOutSideEvent() generates 16
branches: 2 branches for the frame fragments of the alternative frame, 2 more branches
due to the polymorphic call in each frame fragment adding 4 branches. In each of these
4 branches, another 4 branches is added due the loop frame. The number of transitions
are higher then the number of states because of the build-in isomorphism detection
mechanism of GROOVE. During simulation, GROOVE detects the isomorphic states
in different branches of the GTS and merges them reducing the size of the GTS.
We implemented a prototype CMS in Java using the models presented in Section 2.
We also added a sample user interface where the outside events can be sent to the
server: the user interface and the class Server run in different threads. The implemen-
tation of the scenarios and server only consists of the calls presented in the models
of Section 2 with the following exceptions: i) Upon receiving an event the scenarios
call the method ScenarioStatistics.addStatistic(); this call is added to test the wild-
card transitions. ii) To conform with the motivating example the method ResourceM-
anager.requestDeallocate() used for releasing resources is not called by the car crash
scenario upon receiving the preemption event. We ran this prototype with 2 user inter-
face threads, where one user interface sends two start events and the other sends two
allocate events. This run output 4 observed execution sequences, one for each invoca-
tion of the method ScenarioOutSideEvent().
The 4 log files are then transfered into the GROOVE to verify the execution se-
quences. The verification of these state machines took 25 seconds, which includes the
time for abstraction execution generation. For the resource allocation request sent by
the second user interface thread to the presidential emergency scenario, the verification
displayed the mismatch executeMethod(2, PID, ResourceManager, requestDeallocate).
This states that the car crash scenario did not in practice call the method to deallocate
the resources; however, in the GTS from the sequence diagram this method is called.
This case study shows that it is possible check the UML-to-code conformance for
sequence diagrams with polymorphic calls and for execution sequences spanning mul-
tiple sequence diagrams. Moreover, the runtime observer is able to trace sequences that
originated from different sources and overlap.
9 Conclusion
Sequence and class diagrams can provide constraints that go beyond the assert state-
ments commonly used to provide input for runtime monitoring and verification. This is
especially true when the diagrams are intended to describe all possible types of usage
for the system. Moreover, these diagrams are often readily available, when used as part
of the design process of systems. No new notation has to be mastered, or kept updated
as the system evolves, since most development processes anyway require updating the
design for purposes of documentation and maintenance.
It may be argued that the conformance checking can be realized without generat-
ing all possible sequences (as is done here), where the conformance checker traces the
sequence diagrams directly according to the logged execution. For situations where the
number of logs to be checked is small, this is less costly than generating all possible ex-
ecutions in advance. However, direct tracing may become too expensive when the num-
ber of logs to be checked is large. Software systems, like CMS, are usually deployed
at multiple sites and at each site many logs are sampled for consistency checking. Our
approach is designed for such situations.
As future work, we are going to apply the approach to industrial software systems.
In our previous studies, we have applied a similar simulation to the UML models of an
industrial software system from the health care domain [23], where all possible uses of
the software system are specified with sequence diagrams. We observed that the sim-
ulation generated execution sequences that are not explicitly modeled but are possible
due to polymorphism. These execution sequences contained errors, showing the impor-
tance of considering the polymorphism in simulation. The application also showed that
GROOVE and the simulation can scale to the industrial context.
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